In this book, Umut Uzer examines the ideological evolution and transformation of Turkish nationalism from its early precursors to its contemporary protagonists. Turkish nationalism erupted onto the world stage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Greeks, Armenians, and other minority groups within the Ottoman Empire began to seek independence. Partly in response to the rising nationalist voices of these groups, Turkish intellectuals began propagating Turkish nationalism through academic as well as popular books, and later associations published semipropagandist journals with the support of the Unionist and Kemalist governments.
Others were Westernism, Ottomanism and Islamism. During the Constitutional Period, nationalism found support within the circles of the ruling Union and Progress Party. Although it was connected to actionary ambitions such as the Turan Ideal gathering all Turks on earth under one single flag , this nationalism was in fact a defense ideology. The idea of confronting nationalisms, that became dangerous through uprisings, with a counter-nationalism paved the way for the Armenian Deportation and pretty much defined the position to be taken during the WW1, which eventually ended up with defeat.
Nationalism makes easily use of otherizing and polarizing themes and discourses concerning foreign threats, permanent enemies, internal collaborators and traitors, which due to the durable effects of the abovementioned trauma are always updatable.
The feeling of running behind with regard to the construction of a national identity also triggers the complexes based on the differences with the West in terms of development levels, particularly in science, technology and economy. This feeling lurches between envy and the exaggerated nostalgia of the past. As the defense ideology of the Ottoman Empire, nationalism has also been an important component of the founding cement of the Republic of Turkey.
For obtaining the resistance energy required by the War of Independence and later the essential motivation for the foundation of a national state, nationalism has again been used as a vital resource.
In order to establish a nation state on the Ottoman remnants, one had to create a nation first. Within the process, bloodline-Turkist trends, which were limiting the space for consent, have been marginalized and estranged. Since the economic organization of the Republic was almost made from scratch, the necessary ideological material was overwhelmingly provided by nationalism. As can be seen in the pogroms on September , , the nationalization of capital was managed through attempts to expel and annihilate the non-Muslim minorities.
The motivation for development was also purveyed here. Despite the fact that nationalism generated a founding energy for the Republic, it became an official ideology, which continues to be linked to a narrative of defense.
This paved the way for nationalism to become popular and pervade on the ground. During the 60s and 70s, when it was in the vanguard of anti-communism, nationalism also got in cultural contact with the religious conservative line. Yet, from the point of the Kemalist republicanists, the usefulness of nationalism did not decrease: developments such as the Cyprus conflict and neoliberal economic reforms, continued to escalate nationalism.
The Kurdish policy, which the military junta after the coup in pursued and the ensuing long lasting period of conflict, revived the nationalistic narratives and gave it new motives. As I have tried to illustrate in the brief summary above, nationalism has very strong ties with social threat perceptions and national anxieties.
Despite the fact that its assertion for superiority cannot move beyond the glorification of the past and cultural differences, nationalism nonetheless manages to respond to grave complexes. By way of antagonisms, it can create an effortless pride or excuse. The fact that it has been made use of by very different political circles, responding to different needs while its content has been altered accordingly, creates a large space of representation. The fact that Turkish nationalism has been shaped on the grounds of a traumatic defat, increases the reactionary and negative motivation burden it carries.
Various political actors have given a try to a positive reframing of nationalism, yet its political power does not stem from what it claims to be in favour of, but of what it stands against. One property that differentiates Turkish nationalism from the wave of xenophobia we see in Western Europe is its definition of enemy and foreigner. Parallel to this perception, it is a widely accepted idea that there are local collaborators who were either culturally poisoned or bought off by the traditional enemies of the country and that the country harbors a large population of traitors.
For the last five decades Turkish nationalism has been represented by the MHP Nationalist Action Party , however it can be found to varying degrees in other parties as well.
Even looking at this short list suffices to prove how influential a political partner the MHP is. The party seeks to present itself as a right-wing alternative to the AKP, likely in an effort to peel off more secular nationalist Turks from the religious conservative base of the AKP. As Figure 1 shows, these perceptions are almost entirely correlated with political affiliation.
Political affiliation was determined by self-reported vote in the last general election, on November 1, ; this is the standard marker of party affiliation used throughout the report. These partisan divisions on the direction of the country matter much more than other demographic trends in Turkey. Yet beliefs that things are getting worse in Turkey do grow steadily as household income increases.
Moving to the economy, these same partisan divisions emerge across numerous indicators. Older voters report higher levels of worsening living standards than do younger ones, but patterns are fairly stable across other demographic lines such as education and income.
Overall, 42 percent of respondents feel that the economic situation in Turkey will be worse one year from now, with 35 percent believing it will be better. Continuing the patterns seen elsewhere, nearly 9 in 10 AKP voters, or 87 percent, hold favorable views of the president, while similar shares of CHP voters—86 percent—and 84 percent of HDP voters hold unfavorable views of him. Seventy-two percent of MHP voters rate him unfavorably as well.
In a question asking people about their vote intention, the survey finds that if the election were held next Sunday, the AKP would capture 49 percent of the overall vote—with undecided voters distributed proportionally—and the CHP would get 24 percent.
The splintered nature of the opposition in Turkey gives the AKP a marked advantage in the upcoming elections. Barring consolidation of parties or strategic voting for a main opposition force, the president and his party will remain in a solid position for victory in Educational divides exist on this question, with a majority—53 percent—of Turks with a secondary school education or lower approving of the response, compared with slight pluralities of high school graduates and college-educated Turks disapproving.
Patterns are virtually identical on a question related to the force of the response to the attempted coup. In general, do you think these actions by the government are appropriate or inappropriate?
Seventy-eight percent of AKP voters believe the crackdowns on journalists, intellectuals, and other activists are appropriate, while 85 percent of CHP voters, 59 percent of MHP voters, and 83 percent of HDP voters view them as inappropriate. Reactions to the crackdowns were not divided by other demographic indicators.
At the same time, more than one-quarter of CHP voters—27 percent—and one-third of MHP voters, or 35 percent, believe the government is acting in response to real threats to Turkey and its people. These trends among AKP voters require more examination and research to understand fully. Higher-educated and higher-income Turks are much more likely than lower-educated and lower-income Turks to view the crackdowns as an attempt to eliminate and intimidate critical voices.
By a 45 percent-to percent margin, the lowest educated bloc of Turks says that the government is cracking down because of real threats to the Turkish state, while college-educated Turks—by a 34 percent-to percent margin—believe that the government is cracking down because it wants to eliminate critics.
How important is this to your conception of what it means to be a Turk? An overwhelming 86 percent of respondents say that being a Turk is important to them, including 56 percent of them saying that being a Turk is very important to them. The notion of being a Turk is considered very important to a majority of all party members—with the exception of HDP voters. Majorities of men and women, as well as majorities of all age and education groups, feel that being a Turk is very important to them.
In terms of the components of Turkish identity, the survey finds an interesting distribution of ideas that make up this national self-perception. A second category of important concepts centers on beliefs about democracy and historical memory. Notably, national chauvinism and backing of the current government receive much lower levels of intensity in terms of their importance to Turkish self-perception.
Of course, there are big partisan divides on the importance of supporting the government to Turkish self-perception, with AKP voters in favor and opposition party members largely opposed. Additionally, while it should not necessarily be attributed to ethnic chauvinism, there does appear to be considerable sentimental pan-Turkism, visible in the 49 percent of respondents who feel it is very important—and 82 percent responding very or somewhat important—to support Turkish people and kin living outside of Turkey.
Turkey should produce its own military and industrial goods and avoid relying on other countries. Global economic and political elites have too much power over Turkey and should be resisted. Islam plays a central role in my own life and is essential to my understanding of Turkish identity. Turkey spends too much time and money caring for refugees from other countries and should focus more on its own citizens. Turkey should be a secular state that respects the rights of people from all religious backgrounds to practice their faiths with no official state religion.
Immigrants and refugees in Turkey have much to contribute to Turkish society and deserve our support.
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